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1I. Introduction:
Change creates the necessity for more change. Advances in medical tech-
nology, and the incentives of a fee-for-service insurance system, drove up the
costs of care. In response, insurers and purchasers of care began to seek ways
to control these increases in health care costs. Eventually, managed care orga-
nizations sprouted which combined both the delivery and nancing of care to
provide cost-eective care. This combination not only changed many doctors'
incentives to provide care, but more broadly transformed the overall structure
of the American health care market.
This paper examines how the role of the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) has changed and how it should change due to the profound shift to
managed care in our health care system. In particular, this paper focuses on the
role of the FDA as a regulator of the ow of information between pharmaceutical
companies and managed care companies. In short, this paper argues that FDA's
restrictions on information are unduly restrictive and should be loosened.
II. Background on Managed Care:
Though many people feel as if managed care organizations are a recent inven-
tion, in reality the market has slowly moved toward managed care over the last
50 years.~' The rst managed care plans were merely prepaid group-practice
plans, in which doctors provided all the necessary health care services to all
members for a xed up-front fee.2 The need to reduce costs, however,
'John K. Iglehart, The American Health Care System: Managed Care, 327
NEw ENG. J. MED. 742, 743 (1992).
21d. at 743 (discussing the evolution of managed care plans and listing as
examples the Kaiser-Permanente Medical Care Program, Health Insurance plan
of New York and the Group Health of Puget Sound).
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2overwhelmed most opposition to managed care and the market moved forward.3
With the passage of the HMO act of 1973,~ the rst major barrier to managed
care fell. The use of these programs more or less expanded dramatically during
the 1980's and continues to do so.5 For example though only half of US Workers
received health care through managed care plans in 1993, this grew to 73% in
1995.6 Thus while Fee-for-service (traditional indemnity insurance) may have
dominated medical history, managed care rules the present.
While the term Managed Carecan refer to a variety of programs,7 managed
care programs systematically use the theories of management to control the
costs of health care. Furthermore, these programs on average give less deference
and access to the judgment of a health professional then the traditional Fee-for-
Service model. For example, many plans do not allow a patient to simply decide
to see the world's leading heart surgeon. Instead the plans insist that a doctor
chosen or approved by that plan refer the patient rst. Even for the patient
who sees the plan doctor, the decision of the doctor may be hampered by the
knowledge that only certain kinds
3See Alain Enthoven and Sarah J. Singer, Market-Based Reforirn What
to Regulate and By Whom HEALTH AFFAIRS, 105, 114, (Spring 1995) (the
private market has been moving away quite rapidly from traditional free-choice,
fee-for-service health care...the traditional model usually has not survived in
competition on a level playing eld because it prices itself out of business.).
~ 42 U.S.C. x 300 (1997).
5Ross Waien, GeIR yfornvreof.~ot sanie;&ug indusby and
twinaged care ,31 ~vkbc~
Marketing & Media, 28 (Januar) 1996) (reporting that after the 1973 Act,
within 10 years 12.5 million enrolled in lIMO's, which expanded to 45.2 million
by 1993, and surpassed 51 million in 1994).
6Studynds increase in managed health care , BOSTON
GUJBE, January 19, 1997 at A3 (discussing a
study reported in the Winter 1996 edition of Health Aairs ).
7 Iglehart supra note 1, at 744 (stating that managed care programs are
endlessly varied.); see also Carl H. Hitchner, et al., integrated DelivervSvst ems:
A Swvey of Organizational Models ,29 WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW 273 (1994).
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3of care will be reimbursed for certain conditions.8 The threat of lost patients
will force many doctors to adhere to the norms of the plan. Additionally, many
of these plans use standardization and consolidation of resources to save money.
Thus, these plans function with more coordination and arguably more eciency
than the traditional model of an isolated doctor billing random insurance com-
panies for services.
Structurally, these programs can be accomplished in a range of ways, from
contracts between insurance companies and individual doctors or through ex-
plicit organizational integration between insurance companies and groups of
doctors. Dierences in state laws and the actual competition present in mar-
kets, ~ to the dierences in forms for managed care organizations. Despite the
variation, one can still loosely group the most common types into either Inte-
grated Delivery Systems (lDSs),10 Preferred-provider organizations (PPOs), or
Health Maintenance
Organizations (HMO's).11 Regardless of the form or name chosen, the net
result is a system that
8Misuse of Prescription Drugs, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Human
Resources and Intergovernmental Relations, Committee on Government Reform
and Oversight, U.S House of Representatives, 104 th Cong. ( statement of Sarah
F. Jagger, Director of Health Services Quality and Public Health Issues in the
Health, Education, and Human Services Division)(Discussing a survey of doctors
collected by the department which revealed that many doctors modied their
optimal therapies because of reimbursement denials).
~ Hitchner, supra note 7~ at 274.
1OIDSs refers to a capitation plan in which participants pay a xed fee to
receive a stated range of benets from hospitals and doctors aliated with the
plan. The insurance plan in turn pays these doctors and hospitals a set amount
to provide all the necessary care. Thus every patient reduces the amount of
money the hospital or doctor has to care for the other covered patients{and
indeed, to care for their own prot margin. See Generally Keith M. Korenchuk,
Overview: who are the players and what are their needs?, 11 HEALTH SPAN 3
(1994).
11 The LIMO oers lower xed fees to doctors but in return give increased
patient volume. Furthermore and the physicians face peer rather than exter-
nal review of their medical decisions. While the physicians maintains autonomy
with respect to individual medical decisions, the 1-IMO severely limits the physi-
cians access to patients. For example, all specialists get patients only after a
gatekeeper doctor refers the patient. Indeed, if a doctor makes too many ex-
pensive medical decisions, the doctor may be pushed out of the plan! lIMOs
come in two basic varieties: the sta model lIMO or the independent practice
association (IPA). The former makes the physicians employees of the plan, while
the latter merely contracts with individual physicians or groups of physicians
for care. See Generally, Iglehart, supra note I, at 744-745.
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4unites (although to dierent degrees) the nancing and delivery of medical care
to provide the most cost-eective care.
Today the principles of managed care control pharmaceutical companies as
well as doctors and hospitals.12 One estimate found that 50 percent of the drug
market volume was inuenced by managed care, and projections suggest that
this gure will climb to 90 percent by the year 2000. 13 Consequently, man-
aged care plans have considerable leverage to negotiate prices. ~ Furthermore,
managed care's creation of nancial strain may have induced pharmaceutical
companies to reduce their research and development of new drugs.'5 Further-
more, pharmaceutical manufacturers are seeking alliances with treatment cen-
ters through contracts or through buying managed care
16
organizations. Others are cooperating to create complete disease manage-
ment centers in order to adapt to managed care. 17 For example, pharmaceutical
manufacturer Glaxo Wellcome created a
12 Bruce N. Kuhlik, FDA's regulation of Pharmaceutical Communications
in the Context of Managed Care: a suggested approach, 50 Fooo & DRUG LAW
JOURNAL 23 (noting that pharmaceutical manufacturers are transforming re-
search and development, selling techiuques in response to challenges of managed
care).
13 Michael J. Malinowski, Capitation, Advances In Medical Technology And
The Advent of a New Era in Medical Ethics, 22 AM. J. L AND MED. 331 (1996)
(quoting a study by the Boston Consulting Group. The Changing Environment
for U.S. Pharmaceuticals 18 (Apr. 1993); see also Jim Montague and Hilarie
Pitman Who's Paving for Prescriptions 70(2) HOSPITALS 21(1996) (describing
a nding in Retail Method of Payment Report showing that 50 cents of every
dollar spent on prescription drugs is paid by MCO plans).
14 Peter J. Neumann, et. AI.How Should the FDA Regulate Drug Company
Claims that their Products are Cost-Eective?, 15(3) HEALTH AFFAIRS 54
(Fall 1996); Kuhlik, supra note 12, at 28.
15 Kate Nagy, The Side Eects of Managed Care on the Drug lndustry 87 J.
NATL. CANCER INST.
1279 (1995).
i6 See Kate Nagy, The Pharmaceutical Industry buys into Managed Care, 87
J. NATL. CANCER INST. 1278 (1995).
'71d.; See also Barbara Hesselgrave, Pharmaceuticlas; Drug Lores 70(2 1)
Hospitals 1996 46-48, 50 (discussing 'Thsease Management programs).
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5Care Management Division 18 while ZenecaGroup purchased 50% of Salick
Health Care, Inc., a company which specializes in managing cancer and other
chronic condition. 19 pharmaceutical companies have changed in response to
managed care.
The basic eect of all these changes in structures is to change a doctor
from a patient's advocate to one who must allocate scarce health resources in
a utilitarian way.20 Whether this lowers the quality of care actually provided
remains an open question. Some argue that while feefor-service plans gave
physicians incentives to overservice patients,21 physicians now have an
2
incentive to underservice in managed care plans. - Whether underservice causes
more harm than overservice, or the extent of underservice still needs to be
calculated.
Former Surgeon General C. Everett Koop has commented that 1-IMOs can-
not assure us that physicians will, in every instance, put their patients interests
rst. 23 Alarmists argue that plan administrators and not doctors will be lim-
iting the services provided and making judgments about what kind of care the
patient needs. Consequently the average patient could nd this means less
185ee supra text accompanying note 17.
19 Nag)', supra note 16
2OMalinoivski, supra note 15 at 337-338 (noting that modern medicine is enter-
ing a third era in medical ethics of socieoethics, in which the rights of each patient
to care are balanced against the needs of society as a whole).
21 Malinowski, supra note at 336.
22 Steve Schade, Can you trust your doctor? ~.EVENTION, August 1996 at 88
(discussing the pressures on doctors to think about the costs of care rather than
the patient); Korenchuk, supra note 10 at 4.
23 Quotes of the year: the year in review as they said it, HEALTH LINE, Dec 24,
l996available in Lexis, Health Library, Medical and Health News File (quoting
a statemet made by Dr. Koop in regard to the direction of HMO's on 9/11).
6time in the doctor's oce and less time for explanations.24 One study found
that HMO enrollees
tended to complain of unmet health care needs, and were more likely to have
diculty in getting
25
appointments. Furthermore, others question whether competition belongs
in health care at all.26 Simply put, most health care consumers cannot compare
or even chose their plans.27 Thus market
forces would not operate as a check on HMO's which force doctors to get
people out quicker and sicker than under fee-for-service.
Proponents of managed care respond to these points by saying that these
fears are mostly unfounded. Studies so far show no discernible decrease in the
health of plan participants.28 A recent study indicates that those in HMO's
are generally just as satised with their overall care as those in FFS plans.29
Furthermore continual shopping by employers creates pressure on the
30
industry to provide good care. Furthermore, supporters argue that threat of
malpractice liability will prevent care from reaching substandard levels. Even if
malpractice liability and common law
245ee Schwade, supra note at 89.
25 Developments in Brief: SHMO enrollees, Medical Utilization Manage-
ment, November 14, 1996 available in Lexis, Health Library, HCARE le, (quot-
ing a study reported in the Winter 1996 addition of Health Aairs).
26 See Lester Thurrow, Sounding Board: Learning to Say No, 311 NEW ENG.
J. OF MED. 1569, 1571 (1984)(competition would lead to less egalitarian medical
care).
27 Enthoven, supra note at 110. (Discussing the nature of the demand for
health insurance).
285ee Generally Frances C. Cunningham & John Williamson,How does the
Quality of Health Care in
1-IMO's Compare to that in Other settings? An analytic literaure review:
1958 to 1979, 1 Group Health J. 4 (1980).
29Benchmarking Guide: Consumer Satisfaction, Hospitals, January 5, 1997,
available in Lexis,Health Library, HCARE le (Overall, the study did note that
those in 1-IMO's were not as happy with their emergency care as those in other
plans.
305ee Warren, supra note at 29.
6
73i21 U.S.C. 331 (a), (d), (k)
court action would be too slow to establish minimum standards, Congress
can act to prohibit egregious mistreatment policies.
III. The Eect of these Changes on the role of the FDA:
Despite these changes the FDA does not need to so radically change direction
that Congress should revise its statute to give FDA more powers. Keeping
within the scope of its existing regulatory powers regarding labeling, the FDA
would be able to fulll its mandate of protecting the health and safety of the
country. FDA does, however, need to change its strategy now that the FDA faces
a market that essentially has two tiers: The sophisticated prescribers (isolated
doctors and managed care companies) and the patients. The FDA should,
with certain exceptions, refrain from stiing exchanges of information between
managed care organizations and pharmaceutical companies. The main areas
where FDA should think about loosening its positions are cost-eectiveness
claims and o-label usage claims. Furthermore, the FDA needs to establish a
standard for how to treat the statements of partially owned subsidiaries.
A. Cost-Eectiveness Claims
Perhaps one of the most powerful changes caused by managed care is the
development of Pharmacoeconomics{the study of the relative cost-eectiveness
of treatments. Manufacturers of drugs use these pharamcoeconomic studies to
try and convince purchasers that a particular product will save money. Managed
care organizations (MCOs) use these studies to create their list of formularies.
The primary benet of these studies is an economic one, as an aid to decision
making, allowing MCO's to lower their costs. The FDA, however, could use its
authority under the 1962 drug amendments31 to regulate these cost-eectiveness
claims with the same rigorous validation procedures for claims of safety and
eectiveness. MCOs will be educated enough to
7
8adequately assess the validity of any such cost-eectiveness claims without too
much assistance from the FDA.
The FDA created draft guidelines in March of 1995 to respond to this issue
of cost-
32
eectiveness claims. The director of FDA's Center for Drug Evaluation and
Research (CDER), Janet L. Woodcock, commented at a conference on this issue
that the market cried out for FDA
intervention, but that the FDA cannot aord to be the referee in a game
that has no rules.33 The draft rules primarily focus on developing methodological
standards in order to protect the patients. For example, these guidelines declare,
among other things, that pharmacoeconomic claims (including quality of life
claims) need to be supported by two adequate and well-controlled studies. ~
Furthermore, these claims need to be consistent with the approved label .~
Claims of eects which are not included could be considered o-label promo-
tion. 36 Additionally, the CDER Director of Drug Evaluation, Robert Temple,
commented in the conference that the audience of a manufacturer would make
no dierence as to how a claim should be evaluated.
After much criticism of the guidelines, in October of 1995, the agency took
its rst formal step to changing the pharmaceutical marketing policies and held
a public hearing to assess
325ee 60 Fed Reg. 156, 41891 (1995); see also Neumann, suprat note 14;
see also . James G. Dickinson FDA speaks on cost-eectiveness, 30 MEDICAL
MARKETING & MEDIA 48, May 1995 (noting that the director of FDA's Center
for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER) told particpants at a conference on
this issue that the market seemed to demand FDA inteference).
33Dickinson, supra note 32, (quoting Woodcock's statements at the confer-
ence).
345ee note 32.
355ee note 32.
365ee note 32.
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9Pharmaceutical Marketing and Information Exchange in Managed Care Environments.37
The FDA primarily wanted to investigate the changing business relationships,
audiences, marketing claims and channels of communication used in the indus-
try ~38 Woodcock commented that the FDA did not intend to regulate internal
MCO's pharmaeconomic studies but that the dissemination of any studies con-
ducted by a manufacturer would be considered promotional .~ At these hearings
some industry leaders complained that FDA interaction would be premature,
and unlikely
40
to improve protection to consumers. The agency still has not formulated a nal
guideline or posistion, though one should be forthcoming.4'
The basic spirit of health care reform resides in a renewed believe that
competition can work to improve health care. The FDA needs to encourage
this competition without being overly protectionist or alarmist. Unfortunately,
FDA's rst stab at playing umpire created rules( draft guidelines)that were too
restrictive, and that should be replaced. Instead of trying to clamp down on
questionable promotional claims, the FDA should focus on acting as a screen by
making sure the methods used for claims were ok, but not necessarily as strictly
as claims of safety and eectiveness. Indeed, a recent study shows that 59% of
large MCO's would favor such a system
37 60 Fed. Reg. 156,41891 (A notice of public hearing to discuss pharam-
ceutical marketig and information exchange in managed care environments).
381d
393 Health Care Policy Report 42 d 17 (BNA)(1995) (quoting Mitchell
Daniels of Eli Lily as saying that It would be counterproductive for FDA to
move from its traditional posistion).
401d.
41 FDA Cost-Eectiveness Regs could be tailored to the Sophistication of
the Audience, The Pink Sheet(May 13, 1996)(F-D-C Reports (DDMAC Deputy
director said FDA still considering comments, and hopes to have something
soon.)
9
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for pharmaeconmic claims. Furthermore, the study found that 69% would
support a change from the 1995 draft guideline standards of 2 well controlled
studies. Simply put, MCO's would prefer to have data faster even if that data
is less than perfectly accurate. After all, there is a cost to gaining absolute
certainty. These gures indicate that MCO's recognize that though there could
be problems of groundless claims, these MCO's feel capable of distinguishing
between useful and useless claims themselves.
Other mechanisms will stop manufacturers from making and circulating un-
founded claims. First, competition itself forms the rst line of defense. MCO's
will not rely on just one study, but will be able to compare claims of several
manufacturers.43 Secondly, peer reviewed medical journals also exist which pro-
vide reasonably reliable information. Additionally, the pharmaceutical industry
has begun to create its own standards in order to establish credibility with man-
aged care organizationsf'4 Furthermore, Pharmaceutical companies would not
benet from making unfounded claims. On the contrary, the industry is trying
to work with managed care, and thus would not want to take an adversarial
and abusive posistion. In general, the repeat contact nature would do more
to keep the promotions from being misleading then Agency' scrutiny of claims.
Unlike the fragmented physicians of yesteryear, today's doctor works in con-
cert. Thus any manufacturer 'which makes a groundless claim risks creating
bad relationships with not just one prescriber, but ~vith many'.
Even if the market fails to provide adequate protection, the harm falls outside
the realm of things which FDA should be protecting. At the worst a MCO pays
more for a drug than for
42 Id.
43 See id. (Discussing that health care economist Mark Pauly argues that
when information is costly, and the intended audience will be critical of the
information, that dissementation of that information should be pennitted).
~ See Neuman, supra note 14.
10
11another eective drug. Thus the victim will be the bottom line of the MCO.
The FDA already makes sure that drugs are safe and eective before they can
be sold, and the medical doctor who prescribed the drug presents a second layer
of protection for a patient.
As with any approach to a complex problem, some drawbacks exist. Obvi-
ously, not all physicians are part of managed care organizations. Those physi-
cians that continue in isolated practices may need the stamp of the FDA to
help them decide how to assess the relative cost-eectiveness of drugs. Sec-
ondly, there could be other victims besides the MCO's prot margin. In an era
of rising medical costs, economic losses have real health consequences{every dol-
lar spent incorrectly could mean another person not getting adequate care. One
study even showed that MCO's will use the information of cost-eectiveness to
make trade-os in treatment decisions, not just for equally eective treatments,
but across treatments that have diering eciencies and
45
cost. 10% of surveyed plans might fail to endorse eective but more
expensive therapies. These responses are more alarmist then actual. First of
all, ~ve are not at such a crisis of
health care that misallocations due to incorrect information will cost too
many lives in terms of
wasted resources. If we were, then as a society we might be inclined to cut
spending on other areas to concentrate on ensuring there was less of a scarcity' in
medical care. Secondly, doctors still make and are liable for the medical decisions
about what treatments a patient receives. No matter how much MCOs change
doctor incentives, most doctors will still feel a moral responsibly to actually care
for patients. Finally, the study' mentioned above apparently implies that 90%
of plans would cover the use of more eective, but more expensive treatments.
Thus patient care would not be likely' to be hurt by erroneous claims of cost-
eectiveness{if a physician still thinks a treatment is the better treatment most
plans would cover that treatment.
455ee The Pink Sheet supra note 41 (Discussing a report by Anne Elizhauser,of
MEDIAP International, co-authored with Bryan Luce of MEDIAP and Claudia
Steiner of Agency for Health Care Policy and Research. The study showed that
10% of MCO's would discourage cost-increasing, outcome-enhancing technolo-
gies).
11
12B. The Subsidiary Problem
Another area for restraint on the part of the FDA lies in the related issue
of monitoring communications between pharmaceutical manufacturers and sub-
sidiaries formed as pharmacy benet management companies (PBM), or create
disease management centers (DMCs). PBMs administer and process benets
claims, and are often electronically linked to the pharmacies participating in
its programi'~ Furthermore, PBM's seek to lower the MCO's costs by shift-
ing a patient's choice of drugs to a lower-cost generic equivalent.47 Often this
switch relies on formularies chosen by the HMO's doctors to reduce drug costs.
Sometimes however, PBM's may actively try to encourage Physicians to switch
prescription patterns from one drug to another within the same therapeutic
class. DMCs may exacerbate these concerns for these entities as they provide
information on dosage, and choices directly to a consumer.
FDA addressed the PBM issue in the same hearing mentioned above, and
has not yet formulated an ocial posistion on how these communications should
be regulated. Manufactures without PBM's argue that in order to create a level
playing eld the FDA must treat any PBM with signicant contractual relation-
ships with manufacturers as merely a marketing division of the manufactureri~
Those with PBM' s argue that to treat manufacturer owned PBM' s dierently
than
non-manufacturer owned PBM hardly' creates an unfair rather than level
playing eld.49 The FDA should not choose to treat subsidiary PBM promotions
and their drug-switch
~ Drug Benets Under Health Care Reform, Hearing before the Co,nmittee on
Finance, U.S. Senate, 103rd Congress (Statement of Judith L Wagner, Senior
Associate in the Health Program of the Oce of Technology Assessment before
the United States Senate Hearing on Long-Term Care and Drug Benets).
471d.
'~ See Michael Conlan, Tell All,; Full disclosure in managed care Drug-Switch
programs 140 DRUG Tor'cis 87.
491d.
12
13programs as merely part of the manufacturing arm of the associated manufac-
turer. First, this would require costly preapproval of the promotional materials
(as part of the labeling). Secondly, the FDA would need to assess the degree
of independence which may prove impossible.50 Instead, FDA should follow the
approach suggested in the comments led by the Federal Trade Commission.
These suggested that the FDA should merely require PBM's to disclose any
51
aliation with manufacturers of drugs. The FTC also suggested that it
might consider as a deceptive practice any failure to disclose major dierences
in side eects, dosing, and
interactions.52 This approach would be a sensible one{far less burdensome
than pre-approval of all promotional materials of PBM's or drug switch pro-
grams. This recognizes, as mentioned above, that MCO's will be able to be
skeptical of information presented by a manufacturer in order to provide good
care.
C. Promotion of O-label uses:
While FDA faced the issue of O-Label promotion by manufacturres for a
long time, the problem grows more intense in a market of managed care. Dr.
Goodwin commented, in a hearing on FDA reform, ...there is a stealth threat
which could cripple medical progress...today's health
5OFDA Letter, deputy's speech, dene a dile,n,na, FDAs failure to address
pharmaceutical marketing issues involving managed care.31 Medical Marketing
and Media 12. (Discussing comments by FDA Deputy Commissioner Mary
Pendergast).
51 See Conlan, supra note 48.
52
53While disclosure of identity and problems may be enough for a promotion to
1-IMO's or medical doctors,these would not suce for patients. Thus the FDA
would need to monitor more closely the promotions used in DMCs in which
manufacturers more directly target the end consumer. A discussion of how
FDA should regulate such promotions in this setting is beyond the scope of the
present paper.
13
14care environment in which managed are policies and WDA] regulations rein-
force each other.~ Often MCOs refuse to reimburse customers for o-label uses
of drugs.55 Furthermore, stiing communication on o-label use could stie med-
ical innovation. Similarly, the creation of PBM/DMCs adds another wrinkle to
o-label uses. Would a DMCs's reccomendation of an o-label use constitute a
prohibited o-label promotion by a manufacturer? How would FDA know about
such hidden problems, without getting so entangled in the internal communica-
tions of the organization? The FDA's past actions seem to indicate a posistion
that roughly says If o-label use must occur, then limit it to the connes of in-
dividualized treatments certied by medical doctor.~ Yet this posistion ignores
the fundamental change in the way medical practice occurs in MCO's. MCO's
tend to standardize treatments in order to control costs. They need to have
information about o-label uses to create their formularies and guidelines for
reviewing the prescription habits of aliated doctors.57 Structural dierences
in the market require a revised approach.
The FDA cannot credibly enforce a no-o-label promotion posistion. First,
o-label uses are becoming increasingly common, and thus FDA could not stop
all promotion. A recent
S4 Hearing on FDA Reform, House Committee on Commerce, Subcom,nitte
on Health and Environment, May 2, 1996 (Statement of Dr. Frederink Goodwin,
director of the Center on Neuroscience, Medical Progress and Society at George
Washinton University Medical Center).
555ee Jagger Testimony, supra note 8, (nothing that these insances are al-
ready more isolated than before after Medicare allowed payment for nonappoved
drugs).
56 FDA Commissioner for Policy, William B. Schultz, testied before the
Senate that since the legislative history of the Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act
indieates that the Congress did not intend to interfere with the practice of
medicine that physician can use drugs not listed on the FDA approved labeling.
See Jagger Testimony, supra note
8.
57 See James G. Dickinson O-label indications, Something's got to give 30
MEDICAL MARKETING & MEDIA 72 (discussing MCO's which requested
information about a then unapproved drug in order to create formularies 12 to
24 months ahead of actual availability).
14
15study by the AMA found that in nine major drug categories, 60% of uses were
o-label.~
Doctors may prescribe even more o-label uses in treating AIDS or Cancer
patients, and the
American Academy of Pediatrics claims that 80 percent of children's drugs
are o-label.59
Quite often, an o-label use may be the most accepted and soundest treat-
ment. Secondly, the agency cannot practically seize or otherwise hamper the
sale of the products
of every oending manufacturer{thus some manufacturers will not back
down. Indeed, an August 1996 Warning Letter to Pzer Inc. about its pro-
motion of Zoloft for depression therapy resulted from just this problem.60 The
company responded to the letter in a news release which essentially continued
the promotion of using Zoloft for depression (an unapproved use). If a product
saves lives or improves health, then FDA violates its mission by keeping that
product o the market just because a promotional error ~ lead to misuse of
the product. Furthermore, because many products have relatively short lives
(invention creating superior versions relatively
61
quickly), the FDA cannot respond fast enough. While this may jeopardize future
relations with the FDA, intense competitive pressures make many companies
bold enough to take that chance.
After all ,for some drugs o-label uses may be as much as 60% 62 of the
market, and many pharmaceutical manufacturers wish to become a partner to
MCO's in disease management.
Third, changes in technology extend the arena in which o-label uses can
be promoted. For example, a sa~'vy Pharmaceutical company could provide
MCO's with links to its internet
58 See Goodwin Testimony, supra note 54.
591d.
~ See note 50.
61 Id.
621d
15
16homepage. The interconnected nature of the web would allow the company to
very quickly shuttle MCO's to information about its o-label uses. Thus if the
FDA wanted to stop o-label promotions, the FDA would eventually need to
stop o-label discussions that occur electronically.
Despite these diculties, the FDA does have valid concerns with allowing
wholesale oabel promotion. After all, to lower the incentives of manufacturers
to get uses on-the label could lower the overall safety and eectiveness of the
drug supply. Manufacturers may just get drugs tested for one use, and then
promote their drugs for any conceivable use! Instead, the FDA could continue
to stamp out o-label promotion but still make the process of amending the
ecacy supplements easier.63 This would lower the gap between on-label uses
and o-label without undermining the value of the label. Finally, journals exist
which ~vould allow the dissemination of knowledge to encourage research on
o-label uses. Thus allowing o-label promotion may cause harm of lowering
the safety' and ecacy of the drug supply, without osetting benets.
Yet the FDA does not need to allow wholesale o-label promotion, just
some o-label promotions. Speeding the approval process ~~'ill not solve the
underlying problem that manufacturers would have little incentives to conduct
controlled studies to get additional uses onthe-label. The FDA could allow
submission by anyone or itself of independently performed research (such as in
peer-reviewed journal articles)to solve the incentive problem. Yet this approach
would create the danger of watering down the gold standard of FDA's approval.
Instead, a better approach would be to create a safety' zone for o-label pro-
motions, which would allow manufacturers to disseminate peer reviewed journal
articles or other material to MCO's. Currently, the FDA allows manufacturers
to disseminate unbiased reference texts and
63 See Jagger Testimony, supra note 8.
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17articles which were used by the FDA to approve the drug. This policy should
be changed to
allow disseminations of similarly scholarly materials focussing on unapproved
uses as long as the
65
manufacturer prominently indicates the use is o-label. The intense compe-
tition in the industry would soon give MCO' s plenty of counter evidence as to
any ecacy claims of particular
unapproved drugs. Since Fda would need to step in less frequently to catch
abuses, threats of actions by the FDA would carry more weight. Thus this
would create two kinds of promotional material{that based on approved uses,
and that which MCO's would take with the proverbial grain of salt.
IV. Conclusion:
Managed Care is not an unsafe or ineective cure for controlling increas-
ing costs, and FDA should not react to MCO's as such. Instead, the FDA
should take ad~'antage of the sophistication of MCO's by letting the market
assess the validity of promotions, whether they are about o-label uses or cost-
eectiveness. MCO's do not need to be protected as did the country doctors
of yesteryear. If this strategy causes indirect eects on patients, the FDA can
then focus on strengthening its direct protection of the consumer through more
heavily restricting promotions to the consumer. The FDA must do its share to
reduce medical costs, which means reducing the burden of regulations. To do
otherwise imposes needless costs on society in an era where cost-containment
should be a governmental priority'.
~ 61 Federal Register 1%, 25728
65 The FDA should probably continue to prohibit any advertising of o-
label uses which are directed at patients. The primary assumption in advocating
loosened restrictions is that MCO's can view the information critically{but this
does not hold true for patients. A discussion of how FDA should handle the
issue of protecting the consumer is beyond the scope of the present paper.
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